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 Each day that passes sees confirmation of India’s increasingly important position on 
the international scene. India’s rising economic might is unquestionable including, and above 
all, in the area of high technology. As for her military power, this now includes unashamed 
expertise in strategic weaponry from nuclear to ballistic missiles and a sizeable task force in 
the Indian Ocean.  
 This giant of tomorrow, and not the day after tomorrow to labour a point, as far as its 
external relations are concerned, is looking in two directions, directions which as recently as 
fifteen years ago were largely neglected: East Asia and the United States. The “look east” 
policy initiated by Narasimha Rao in the 1990s, when Manmohan Singh – today’s PM - was 
Finance Minister, has borne fruit: in 2005 East Asia overtook the European Union as India’s 
first trading partner largely due to burgeoning Sino-Indian trade. While the “look east” policy 
may have had essentially economic objectives, it has also resulted in India’s entry into the 
only functioning regional security arrangement in East Asia, the ASEAN Regional Forum. As 
for the United States, as the recent visit of President George W. Bush demonstrated, 
relations have hit new highs in both the political and economic areas. The United States is 
now India’s largest single national trading partner and the biggest source of FDI mainly as a 
result of the massive arrival of US high tech multinationals to set up production and research 
facilities on Indian soil. In the political arena, the two countries signed an Agreement in 2004, 
the Next Step Towards a Strategic Partnership, a military agreement in June 2005 and 
significant steps forward have been made in the realm of civil nuclear energy during the visit 
of Bush in February 2006: every year something more happens! 




Within this global context it is disappointing to find that the European Union hardly 
figures on the Indian “radar screen”, despite tangible efforts to relaunch cooperation between 
the two political entities. If remediable action is not undertaken quickly, Europe may well find 
itself completely sidelined by this new first order Asian – and indeed international – actor. 
 
Which Strategic Partnership? 
In the early part of this decade considerable efforts were made to kick-start 
cooperation between India and the European Union. The first EU-India Summit held in 
Lisbon in June 2000 heralded a new political willingness to foster closer bilateral relations in 
all areas. Since 2000 regular annual summits have been held, accompanied by the setting 
up of joint working groups and a plethora of joint initiatives, such as the Joint Initiative on the 
Enhancement of Investment and Trade, which dates from 2001. The culmination of these 
rapprochement initiatives was the signing, in June 2004, of a New Strategic Partnership 
Agreement, which defined five priority areas of cooperation: 
a. Multilateral cooperation in the international sphere with an emphasis on 
conflict prevention, anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, the promotion of 
democracy and the defence of human rights. 
b. Strengthened economic cooperation involving sectorial dialogues et jointly 
drafted regulatory policies. 
c. Cooperation in development so as to enable India to achieve the 
Millennium Goals as framed by the United Nations. 
d. Intensifying intellectual and cultural exchange. 
e. Improving the institutional framework of Indo-European relations. 
 
While there have been some tangible results of these efforts in improving 
cooperation, the overall balance sheet is mixed. Some concrete achievements deserve 
mentioning. For example India has become a participant in the ITER and GALILEO 
programmes, thus significantly improving the potential for much enhanced cooperation 
between the European Space Agency and its highly innovative Indian counterpart, the Indian 
Space Agency. Furthermore a 33 million euro scholarship scheme, within the Erasmus 
Mundus framework, has been established in order to encourage student exchange between 
India and the European Union. The creation of a Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at 
the University of Delhi in 2002 should also contribute to achieving these objectives. 
Nevertheless, these specific achievements do not, in themselves, remove the overall sense 
of unease engendered by an examination of Indo-European relations in all areas. While it 
would be misguided to underestimate the importance of student exchange and the 




recruitment of Indian students in European universities, the dozen of thousands Indian 
students in Europe pale in comparison compared to the 80,000 studying in the United States 
(India having overtaken China as the largest source of overseas students there). Not only are 
those students (and their graduated predecessors) a vital element in strengthening US-
Indian relations, they are also a precious source of qualified manpower for the US economy, 
particularly given the noteworthy excellence of Indian students in basic and applied scientific 
research. 
In the area of economic relations the tendency is equally worrying. As mentioned 
previously, East Asia (i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) became the first 
trading partner of India in 2004, accounting for 20% of overall trade, eclipsing the European 
Union which previously held that position but had fallen back to 19% of overall trade. More 
alarming are the shares of total international trade and investment: in 2004 India accounted 
for a mere 1.7% of imports and exports with the European Union, ranking it as only twelfth 
largest trading partner. As far as investment is concerned, India received a derisory 0.3% of 
the EU’s total FDI in 2004. France, for example, with its 2.63% of total FDI in India was 
behind South Korea and just before Singapore. India is still a victim of a European obsession 
with China, which is translated in the fact that for every euro invested by the EU in India, 
some twenty euros are invested in China! 
It is, however, on the political level - involving both diplomatic and strategic objectives 
– that EU-Indian relations appear the most bogged down. As in the economic field European 
diplomacy is inordinately focused on the Middle Kingdom. Chris Patten, the former 
Commissioner for External Relations, was probably the only European Commissioner in 
recent years to have taken India seriously. Responsibility for deteriorating EU-India relations 
should, nevertheless, be entirely laid at the door of the Europeans. Some responsibility for 
this parlous state of affairs can be found in India itself. While some elements of the Indian 
media may express concern over Indian indifference towards the EU, in other quarters there 
is not merely indifference, but downright hostility. This is partly explainable by a series of 
disagreements over, for example the International Criminal Court or the Ottawa Convention 
against anti-personnel mines, two matters on which the Indians are very reticent. There is 
also a perception of what is categorized as European interference in Indian domestic affairs, 
for example over human rights issues, the Kashmir conflict or child labour. Nevertheless 
these generally short-lived differences are merely symptoms of a greater malaise. 
A significant section of the Indian elite, that of the nouveaux riches, seemingly drunk 
with a sense of newly acquired power, does not bother to hide its disdain for a Europe seen 
as mired in its economic stagnation and content with the bourgeois comfort of elderly 
retirees. For this part of the elite, Europe is a “has-been”, morally and intellectually 




exhausted, its Welfare State untenable and doomed to decline. The Indian press took, for 
example, great delight in exposing the suburban violence in France in autumn 2005, depicted 
as yet another symptom of the crises in European society. Explaining this in terms of the 
haughtiness of the new winners does not go far enough. India is seeking its revenge on its 
colonial past. Indians still carry the burden of victimhood, even if their Prime Minister in a visit 
to Britain last summer acknowledged that the main democratic institutions in India were 
created during the colonial period. This being said, an increasingly nationalist India, an India 
rushing towards the future, has no time to recognize its debts to the past. The European 
Union can easily be seen as a target of this anti-colonial rhetoric precisely because in some 
of its paternalistic behaviour it demonstrates an enduring colonial mentality. The Mittal Affair 
provides a perfect example of this attitude. Although the CEO of Mittal Steel, Lakshmi Mittal; 
is Indian – and vaunted as a national hero – his company is not. Despite that fact, the way 
the OPA bid was handled by political actors in Europe and by the representatives of Arcelor 
compounded a sense of racial discrimination. The Indian media had a field day in vilifying the 
double standards of the EU, ever ready to play the capitalist game when it suits them, but 
refusing to play it when it does not. After all India saw no objections in allowing Lafarge to 
become a giant of the Indian cement industry. Why should this not be possible with the 
reverse scenario in the steel industry? Because “Arcelor makes perfume while Mittal Steel 
makes eau de cologne”, to use the impetuous phrase of one of Arcelor’s directors? Such 
impetuous declarations were easily labelled as racist by the Indian press. The Indian Minister 
for Commerce and Industry, Kamal Nath, warned the EU Commission that opposition to the 
bid violates norms of the WTO and nobody in Europe paid attention to Mittal’s argument that 
his firm and Arcelor were European companies which should better join hands to resist 
China’s ambitions.   
At the same time France was accused of treating India as a giant garbage bin by 
carelessly sending the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, laden with undisclosed but significant 
amounts of asbestos, to be broken up in the scrap metal yards of Gujarat.  
This being said, the assertive post-colonial nationalism of a rapidly modernising India, 
one directed at decadent Europeans with seemingly no sense of fair play, does not in itself, 
explain the widening gulf between the EU and India. Underlying the chronic nature of present 
EU-India misunderstanding is the fact that new forms of Indian nationalism are calling into 









The Myth of Indian Multilateralism  
Unfortunately Europeans have the illusion that India and the European Union share a 
vision of the world founded on multilateralism. This is not the case. Indian discourse on 
multilateralism and the need for a multipolar world is, at least to some extent, a smoke 
screen, designed in particular for European consumption. It should be noted that the legacy 
of India’s commitment to the Third World within the Non-Aligned Movement is one tinged with 
a kind of anti-imperialist rhetoric directed, above all, at US hegemony. Apparently this would 
seem to have affinities with France’s desire to develop Europe as one of the poles of power 
in a multipolar world and to the European project of promoting a system of international 
norms. 
In practice, however, successive Indian governments are basically pragmatic and, in 
point of fact, since the 1990s have shown in their behaviour a more neo-realist or realpolitik 
view of international relations. In the minds of Indian leaders the United States offers 
leadership that can not be easily dismissed, while Europe seems still to be looking for an 
international role, and is not a major international actor due to its own internal divisions and 
the lack of any credible way of projecting its power. This perception of an effete Europe cuts 
across the Indian political spectrum: while the nationalists of the BJP were the first to 
propagate such a view in the 1990s, the Congress Party has taken on board the same view. 
Evidence for the salience of this view can be found in the explanations proffered by 
Manmohan Singh to his Communist allies, the only political group to have shown any 
misgivings over closer US-Indian relations. Moreover, in both the very warm congratulations 
offered to President Bush after his re-election and in the absence of high-ranking Indian 
dignitaries at the funeral of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, can be discerned a realist 
concern for India to align itself with the only world superpower.   
The overwhelming importance attributed in India to hard power largely explains the 
disdain in India for the European Union. Europeans see themselves as heralds of a form of 
world governance based on norms and embedded in international law and in multilateral 
institutions. The United States, on the other hand, is not averse to justifying the use of force 
in international relations. While Nehru, like Gandhi before him, may have believed in the 
importance of values (or norms as we might say today), the India of today is fascinated by 
hard power. Strategic specialists in many Indian think tanks feel that making India the 
“world’s largest democracy” will bring far fewer benefits to India than did the nuclear tests of 
1998. In other words “hard power” wins over “soft power” and Mars over Venus, to borrow 
Paul Kagan’s hackneyed expression. There is a total coherence in the new Indian approach:  
after all, did the West bother to listen when India defended certain values or leaders such as 
the Dalai Lama? Moreover, India’s willingness to flex its muscles on the international stage is 




being encouraged by concomitant initiatives of other large and middle-level powers to 
encourage India to be not only a regional centre of power, but also a major international 
actor. The 1998 nuclear tests were the first tangible signs of an emancipated and powerful 
India. Today the search for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the leadership 
role taken in the WTO attest to the same objectives. 
In the long term, the Indian approach should weaken the US-India partnership. 
However, in the short term, this partnership will be strengthened to the detriment of the EU-
India cooperation, for India is not yet strong enough to be able to go alone but can prepare 
itself behind the umbrella of US protection. For the US, “playing the India card” to use a 
widely-heard cliché in Washington, in making India the United States’ best ally in Asia, is 
seen as an effective way of counter-balancing China. In this light, the June 2005 strategic 
and military agreement between the US and India - by dint of which the two countries have 
agreed to cooperate together in overseas peace-keeping operations - is highly significant.  
This agreement will probably dampen the interest of India for similar types of cooperative 
activity with Europe, even though this was precisely one of the objectives of the Strategic 
Partnership Agreement signed a full year earlier between India and the European Union! 
 
 
What is to be done? 
In this unfavourable climate in EU-India relations urgent action is required if a further 
deterioration is not to become irreversible.  Four types of action are at the EU’s disposal, 
even if there are elements in the present situation beyond its control. The first of these is to 
strengthen a sense of European unity and to fight against the overriding trend of each 
Member State to go it alone in its relations with India. This occurs even in areas where 
common European policies have been agreed. One not insignificant example concerns 
research activities: while the EU may have initiated a joint agenda, in practice most efforts in 
the area of joint research activities are negotiated and run on a bilateral basis. While Europe 
remains incapable of unifying its own strengths, not only will it deprive itself of its major 
advantages, it will compromise any chance of being perceived, and respected, as a single 
entity. In India the “every member state for itself” approach is not merely unworkable, it is 
counterproductive. Given India’s size, its burgeoning economy and its increasing political and 
military power, the only possible European partner for India is the European Union as a 
whole. The sooner this reality is accepted the better for all of Europe.  
Secondly European diplomacy in relation to India vis-à-vis China needs to be 
rebalanced. In India, the pro-Chinese bias of the European Union is ill received. For Indians 
the Sino-centrism of Europeans is paradoxical, given Europeans’ purported concern with 




promoting democracy and the Rule of Law, two areas in which China’s record leaves a great 
deal to be desired. Why should such a country be favoured over India? In such a context, the 
US seems far less hypocritical, for in American discourse, including amongst the 
Neoconservatives, denouncing Chinese authoritarianism and promoting democracy go hand 
in hand. A more balanced European policy would be well received in India if it also involved 
actively supporting India’s campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, an 
objective opposed by China and one on which the US is very reticent. Supporting India’s 
permanent membership on the UN Security Council would have the added advantage of 
bringing India back to the multilateralist fold. Nothing would to be lost in this attempt. When 
given the opportunity, India has shown it can act responsibly in a multilateral context as the 
2005 campaign of the G4 demonstrated and India’s votes at the IAEA have also shown. 
Thirdly, Europe needs to play on its industrial strengths to relaunch its cooperation 
with India. Two areas here are of primary importance, namely infrastructure and 
environmental protection because they are both areas of vital necessity for India. Problems 
arising from pollution and the shortage of drinkable water will soon compromise India’s 
economic growth. Given longstanding European sensitivity to environmental questions, as 
well as its technological capacities, this is clearly a field in which Europe can offer solutions 
to India’s problems. As far as infrastructure is concerned the priority area is that of energy, 
for India is experiencing serious shortages, and is over-dependent on petrol and coal, two 
expensive and polluting fossil fuels. India’s efforts to secure gas supplies and develop 
nuclear energy are two tangible results of this situation. The European Union and particularly 
France’s lead in the latter area of technology is recognized by the Indian authorities, and this 
is undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the Indian government still maintains a residual 
interest in Europe. 
Finally, to turn to initiatives that would help revive EU-Indian cooperation in areas that 
are both symbolic and substantive, those of higher education and work experience. By being 
far more flexible in providing visas to Indian students and professionals, considerable 
progress could be made in removing one of the continual thorns in the side of EU-Indian 
relations. By taking into account the concerns of Indian students who wish to study in France, 
for example, then both parties would benefit. Today Indian students who study in most 
European countries, including France, have to return immediately once they have finished 
their studies. Changing labour and immigration laws so as to allow a graduate to find a job in 
Europe would have three distinct advantages. First of all, it would send a clear and positive 
political message to Delhi on a sensitive subject, and furthermore it would allow European 
companies to hire well-qualified Indians who would then be able to work later in their Indian 
subsidiaries. Above all, by introducing greater flexibility over visas, one of the factors that 




today limits the ability of Europe (and particularly France) to attract the best Indian minds 
would be removed. Indian students feel it is useful to begin their careers in the place of their 
higher education, not only for the professional experience this brings, but also to enable them 
to repay their debts.    
  
 
